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Web applications are on the rise and rapidly evolve into mature
replacements for their native counterparts. This trend is mainly
driven by the attainment of platform-independence and instant
deployability. While web applications are getting more and more
complex, scalability and responsiveness remain key challenges that
are addressed by rather costly approaches such as cloud computing.
In this paper, we present Edgar, a novel middleware for web ap-
plications that enables client-side execution of code usually requir-
ing server-side deployment due tomissing trust in clients. Following
the paradigm of Function-as-a-Service, applications consist of func-
tions that can be distributed to browsers. Other nearby browsers
can discover these functions and then directly invoke them on a
peer-to-peer basis. Thus, client-side resources are used to provi-
sion the web application, which generates lower costs for service
providers. Offering premium services such as liberation from ads
can be used to incentivise users to provide their resources. In case
of resource shortage or unresponsive clients, execution falls back
to a cloud-based infrastructure. Edgar combines WebAssembly for
executing workloads written in different languages at near-native
speed, WebRTC for browser-to-browser communication and Intel
SGX to establish trust in other browser’s computations. We evaluate
Edgar by implementing a digital assistant as well as a recommen-
dation system. Our evaluation shows that Edgar generates lower
costs than traditional deployments, scales linearly with increasing
client numbers and manages unresponsive clients well.
1 INTRODUCTION
Web applications are becoming the de facto standard for deploying
software across various platforms. Advanced web applications even
create user experiences similar to native ones by offering features
such as offline usage or push notifications while simultaneously
liberating users from installing apps. There are multiple reasons for
this trend: (i) improved platform-independence through standard-
ised browser APIs; (ii) low entrance barriers for web development;
(iii) the possibility of instant deployment of web apps; and (iv) high
acceptance by end-users. Web applications need to be scalable to
cope with peak demands and highly responsive to offer good user
experience.
To meet these demands, diverse approaches have been estab-
lished. Server-side scalability can be improved by deploying ap-
plications on highly scalable cloud-based architectures (Fig. 1a).
Furthermore, Edge computing [1] and Content Delivery Networks
(CDNs) [2, 3] can be used to move computation and data closer
to end-users to improve latencies and, therefore, overall respon-
siveness (Fig. 1b). Although promised to be cost-effective, these
cloud-based approaches still come at certain costs [4, 5] which are
often underestimated1. These costs can even become unsustainable
for certain classes of application providers such as non-profit or-
ganisations, scientists or start-ups. But also larger companies aim
to operate as cost-efficiently as possible.
A more cost-saving approach for service providers is to design
their applications to use client-side resources by offloading computa-
tion (Fig. 1c). This approach has three advantages: (i) reduced costs
for service providers as client-side resources are utilised; (ii) higher
responsiveness for users, as less interaction with remote service
providers is necessary; and (iii) improved scalability, as the whole
application can scale linearly with increasing client numbers. Con-
sequently, outsourcing application logic to web clients is already
common practice today. In fact, 98% of websites implicitly use client-
side resources by deploying JavaScript code [6]. This is implemented
with scripting languages such as JavaScript and –more recently–
WebAssembly (see § 2.2), a binary instruction format designed for
the web.
However, this offloading approach is generally limited. Web
clients are not trustworthy; ultimately, the owners of the machines
have to be regarded as powerful attackers. Their attacks can lead
to wrong, incomplete or even malicious results or leak confidential
code or data. Therefore, application developers so far refrain from
offloading sensitive application parts to clients (e.g. code that con-
tains business secrets and/or processes private data). Furthermore,
web clients can only perform computations for themselves which
inhibits the deployment of distributed applications using client-side
resources. Making client-side resources available to other clients

























(d) offloading with Edgar
Figure 1: Approaches for improving scalability and responsiveness of web applications by moving computations ( ) to different
locations (a-c). Edgar (d) offloads computation to web clients and uses trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect against
attackers. Computations can still be performed on a server-side fallback for bootstrapping applications.
capable CPUs. Such devices (e.g. wearables) cannot be used for ex-
tensive computations, but could benefit from more capable clients
with potentially idle resources. Users of these machines can be
incentivised to provide resources by offering premium services to
them (e.g. ad-free services or bonus features).
To further develop client-side computing in web applications, we
present Edgar (Fig. 1d), a novel middleware that enables service
providers to distribute their web application equitably over its
currently active users. Edgar opens up new possibilities of client-
side resource usage, and can therefore reduce costs for service
providers while still offering good scalability and responsiveness.
Edgar achieves this via the following contributions:
(1) Trusted Execution in Web Browsers. Edgar is the first sys-
tem that enables trusted execution of both JavaScript and Web-
Assembly in web browsers. This allows deploying code on client-
side that would normally be located on server-side due to confiden-
tiality of the code itself or the data processed by it. This creates new
use cases for offloading code and can thus save costs for service
providers.
(2) ExtendedUsage of Client-sideResources. Edgar extends the
concept of using client-side resources in web applications. In Edgar,
clients implicitly provide resources for provisioning the currently
used web application to other users. By combining this with its
trusted execution capabilities (1), Edgar does not expose code or
data and ensures genuine computations. Moreover, it is designed to
not overload peers and also enables users to limit resource usage
on their machines.
(3) Proximity-based Code Distribution. For achieving contribu-
tion (2), a programming model supporting flexible code distribution
is needed. Therefore, Edgar transfers the paradigm of Function-
as-a-Service (FaaS) to web clients. This allows the distribution of
small, self-contained functions based on browser proximity. Edgar
enables the discovery of participating browsers nearby and allows
other clients to invoke functions directly without additional net-
work hops. This reduces response times and can therefore improve
the overall responsiveness of the web application. In case of in-
sufficient numbers of contributing browsers, function invocation
falls back to the same functions deployed on a cloud-based FaaS
infrastructure.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows:
§2 introduces the main technologies behind Edgar and discusses
the underlying assumptions and threat model;
§3 describes Edgar’s design, explaining the systems require-
ments, its orchestration and explains how trusted function
execution in browsers is achieved;
§4 gives details on how we implemented Edgar as well as how
developers can implement Edgar functions; and
§5 shows that Edgar scales linearly with increasing numbers of
clients, copes with unresponsive clients and generates lower
costs than traditional cloud deployments.
2 OFFLOADING FUNCTIONS TO WEB
BROWSERS
Here, we describe the three emerging technologies that form the ba-
sis of Edgar: Peer-to-peer communication between browsers (§ 2.1)
with WebRTC, browser-based computation with JavaScript and
WebAssembly (§ 2.2), and trusted execution as provided by Intel
SGX (§ 2.3). We conclude this section with defining our assumptions
and threat model (§ 2.4).
2.1 Browser-to-browser Communication
In the past, browsers were unable to communicate directly with
each other. Instead, communication was achieved by using the
server-side web application as a relay; adding unnecessary latency
and imposing a potential bottleneck. Web Real-Time Communi-
cation (WebRTC) [7] changes this with a collection of protocols
that enable direct browser-to-browser communication. WebRTC
is already supported by all major browsers and provides mature
JavaScript APIs. In addition to audio and video streams, it offers
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data channels to transmit arbitrary data. However, WebRTC can-
not work entirely without servers. For connection establishment,
a well-known signaling server is needed. Edgar uses WebRTC to
invoke distributed functions directly from other browsers.
2.2 Computation in Web Browsers
Computation within web pages is possible since the appearance of
JavaScript. However, the language itself has many shortcomings
that mainly result from its weak type system. Therefore, JavaScript
is increasingly being used as a compilation target for stricter pro-
gramming languages such as TypeScript [8]. The newest advance-
ment in terms of browser-based computing is WebAssembly, a
platform-independent binary instruction format [9]. Its code is not
designed to be written by programmers directly; instead, it is used
as a compilation target. Mature support for compilation from C,
C++, C# and Rust already exists, while support for other program-
ming languages including Java, Go, and Python is currently being
developed. Edgar uses the JavaScript and WebAssembly runtime
V8 for function execution.
From a service provider’s point of view, computations performed
in browsers are untrusted. Browsers can return wrong, incomplete
or no results at all. This problem is usually circumvented by validat-
ing the results on the server-side, which often involves recompu-
tations [10]. Additionally, it has been shown that input validation
happening on both client- and server-side can introduce vulnera-
bilities [11]. Furthermore, this approach leads to undesired code
duplication between client- and server-side code; in the worst case
in different programming languages.
2.3 Intel Software Guard Extensions
Starting 2015, Intel’s consumer CPUs include the Software Guard
Extensions (SGX), which enable the instantiation of Trusted Ex-
ecution Environments (TEEs). Such a TEE protects the integrity
of code and data and is called enclave in the context of SGX. All
computations inside such an enclave are isolated from potentially
malicious software components, including privileged code. Enclaves
allocate an isolated memory region within the process’s address
space. Pages of this memory region are stored in a reserved mem-
ory region, called the Enclave Page Cache (EPC). SGX protects
the integrity and confidentiality of all EPC pages using checksums
and transparent memory encryption. Additionally, enclaves can
be authenticated by a remote challenger in a process called remote
attestation. Thereby, an enclave identity including the enclave’s
code and, optionally, user-defined data is authenticated. The chal-
lenger sends the signed report to a trusted attestation service that
can confirm the trustworthiness of the corresponding enclave, i.e.
whether it contains the expected code and is running on a genuine
SGX platform.
Adapting Applications for SGX. Existing applications cannot
be executed in SGX enclaves without additional measures. Due to
the underlying threat model, certain operations like system calls
are not allowed, as they might compromise enclave isolation. The
straightforward way of enabling legacy applications (e.g. a Web-
Assembly runtime) to run in SGX enclaves is manual partitioning
(e.g. [12]). However, this imposes an extensive effort for larger ap-
plications and only limited approaches for automated partitioning
exist [13, 14]. Several research projects [15–17] already explored
possibilities of running legacy applications without changing their
code using shielded execution and library operating systems (OSs).
Edgar uses such a library OS, namely SGX-LKL [17] to enable
execution of JavaScript and WebAssembly inside SGX enclaves.
Availability andAlternatives.With SGX being available onmany
recent Intel CPUs, our implementation of Edgar naturally relies
on it. Since Edgar’s design is not tied to SGX, alternative TEE
implementations such ARM TrustZone or Keystone [18] could be
used (see §4). These, however, offer different security guarantees.
2.4 Assumptions and Threat Model
In an Edgar deployment, two entity types interact frequently: many
users and a single service provider. The users want to use the web
application provided by the service provider. In turn, the service
provider wants to make use of the users resources to provision that
very service. We expect users will support the usage of client-side
resources for different reasons, depending on the actual applica-
tion. In the simplest case, users will regard the web application
itself as incentive and use it as is. For scientific or non-profit or-
ganisations, altruistic users will support applications that would
otherwise not be possible, such as a volunteer computing system
like SETI@home2. Additionally, Edgar enables users to indirectly
pay for services by contributing to their provisioning. This keeps
providers from displaying ads, charging fees or selling their users
data to cover their expenses.
As client machines are outside the service provider’s control, we
consider them as untrustworthy and propose that providers offload
sensitive computations or critical data only to clients equipped
with a TEE. Furthermore, users do not trust the machines of other
users. However, we assume the user to the trust service provider to
perform a proper remote attestation (see § 2.3) with all peers. This
assumption is reasonable, as a proper attestation is in the interest
of the service provider who wants to ensure the integrity of the
application. Finally, the resources provided by the users are still
unreliable. Frequent disconnects have to be expected, as users might
close their browsers, shut down their machines or have an unstable
network connection. Since Edgar relies on Intel SGX, we assume a
correct implementation of SGX in hard- and software as well as a
properly working attestation service (see § 2.3). We are aware of
side-channel attacks affecting SGX (e.g. [19–23]). These have either
been fixed by updates of microcode3, the SGX SDK4. Furthermore,
research on side-channel mitigation has been conducted [24–26].
We expect work to continue in this direction and therefore consider
them outside the scope of our work. Finally, in contrast to most
SGX-related threat models, we explicitly do consider denial-of-
service attacks in the distributed setting of Edgar. If parts of the
application are subject to such attacks, execution can be transferred























Figure 2: Architecture with one Edgar browser and one
legacy browser. Trusted components are denoted in green, un-
trusted ones in red. Solid arrows show function invocations
on other peers, while dashed arrows show more infrequent
interactions such as fetching functions, communication with
the orchestrator or invoking fallback functions.
3 DESIGN
In this section, we describe how we design Edgar. We start by
detailing the system requirements in accordance with our threat
model (§ 3.1), followed by a brief overview of Edgar in § 3.2. Fur-
thermore, we explain how Edgar is deployed in a scalable manner
in the cloud (§ 3.3) and on client-side (§ 3.4), give details on Edgar
functions (§ 3.5), discuss which types of applications benefit most
from Edgar (§ 3.6), and describe security-related design choices
(§ 3.7).
3.1 System Requirements
A system for securely offloading functions to distributed, untrusted
web browsers must fulfil the following requirements:
𝑅1 Scalability. An Edgar application should scale linearly with
increasing numbers of clients.
𝑅2 Isolation. Function execution must be isolated from the execut-
ing host, i.e. the code delivered to clients needs to be unable to
access or manipulate its environment.
𝑅3 Language agnosticism. Edgar should support a wide range of
programming languages for the developer to choose from; also
to ease porting efforts for legacy applications.
𝑅4 Integrity and confidentiality. Edgar should protect the integrity
of all functions as well as the confidentiality of their in- and
outputs, enabling to offload code that would traditionally be
located on the server-side.
𝑅5 Availability.All function calls issued to Edgar should eventually
succeed, even if an insufficient number of peers participate or
individual browsers misbehave.
In the following, we describe Edgar in a nutshell to explain how it
fulfils these requirements.
3.2 Edgar in a Nutshell
Fig. 2 shows the architecture of Edgarwith two clients; one Edgar
browser (i.e. a browser with support for trusted function execu-
tion) and one legacy browser (i.e. a browser without TEE support).
Edgar allows deploying web applications on distributed, usually
untrusted browsers to reduce the centralised resources needed for
operation. While this diminishes costs for service providers, it can
also reduce load and response times for users. Clients can rely on
nearby peers that have a certain functionality already loaded and
initialised. All Edgar browsers that load an Edgar application au-
tomatically contribute to provisioning that very application, thus,
increasing overall scalability (𝑅1). Furthermore, legacy browsers
can still benefit from other Edgar browsers without contributing
to it. However, activation of this feature is optional.
Following the paradigm of FaaS, Edgar applications consist of
one or multiple functions. These allow a fine-grained, parallel distri-
bution, which also increases scalability (𝑅1). Edgar functions can
be developed using JavaScript andWebAssembly, providing two im-
portant properties: First, isolation from the host is guaranteed (𝑅2),
because runtimes for both languages are designed as execution
sandboxes. These are already used for executing untrusted code
in browsers today. Second, many programming languages are sup-
ported (𝑅3), as both languages can act as compilation targets (see
§ 2.2). This eases porting existing FaaS applications to Edgar.
When an Edgar browser loads an application, the middleware
first contacts the orchestrator. It has a global view over all partici-
pating browsers and can decide which set of functions the newly
connected browser should install locally, based on an application-
specific policy (e.g. highest priority for latency-sensitive functions).
Additionally, the orchestrator is used by new clients for peer dis-
covery; it continuously pings the peers and measures the response
times of peers to enable discovery based on proximity. For installa-
tion, function code is first fetched from a cloud-hosted function store
and then deployed locally in a TEE based on Intel SGX (see § 2.3).
This enclave protects the integrity of function code and confiden-
tiality of in- and outputs (𝑅4). Optionally, functions can be delivered
in an encrypted format to gain code confidentiality. This way, ap-
plication logic that usually requires a trusted server environment
can be offloaded to clients. Installed functions can then be invoked
by other browsers. The router component located on every client
forwards the application’s function invocation request to clients
that have that function installed. Note, that this can also be the
same client that issued the request. All functions are additionally
deployed on a FaaS infrastructure we refer to as the fallback. This
allows bootstrapping an Edgar application without enough peers
being available (𝑅5). Furthermore, this generates negligible costs
when enough peers are available.
Providers of an Edgar application should distribute theworkload
evenly across clients, so that users cannot differentiate between
only using an application or providing resources to its provisioning.
We argue that users implicitly accept providing resources, because
their incentive is to use the application. A weaker form of this
concept is also common practice today, as most users do not inspect
the client-side code before visiting a website. Furthermore, Edgar
allows limiting the resource usage (see § 3.4) and stops allocating
resources as soon as the application of interest is closed. Especially
for applications of non-profit organisations or scientists, altruistic
users might voluntarily donate resources. For other applications,
in conjunction with trusted resource accounting [27, 28], premium
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3.3 Edgar’s Cloud Components
Here, we describe Edgar’s cloud-based components and discuss
their scalable deployment.
Orchestrator. To operate, Edgar needs to keep track of available
peers. In theory, a fully distributed approach (e.g. with Edgar peers
deploying a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) [29]) would be possible.
However, to allow bootstrapping especially for smaller applications,
this would require peers that also contribute resources when not
using any Edgar application. Therefore, Edgar deliberately uses a
centralised component operated by the service provider for orches-
trating peers: the orchestrator. The orchestrator keeps track of all
available peers for two reasons. First, it can instruct them to load a
set of functions. Second, the stored information is used to enable
peer discovery. Before function deployment, the service provider
adds a distribution factor and weight to each function. The higher
the distribution factor, the more will the corresponding function
be installed. The weight represents the expensiveness of functions,
reflecting howmany resources it uses. When Edgar is initialised on
a new client, it connects to the orchestrator to announce its avail-
ability and machine size, reflecting its computing power. This value
can be determined by the browser’s user agent, static hardware
information, or a benchmark executed before connecting.
Subsequently, the orchestrator identifies the least represented
function fitting the connecting client according to distribution fac-
tor and weight, and instructs it to install this function. This process
is repeated, as long as the cumulative weights of all functions does
not exceed the machine size. The orchestrator stores the mapping
of which functions are distributed to which peers in order to share
a subset of this mapping with new clients. When an Edgar appli-
cation needs to invoke a function, the Edgar client first sends a
discovery request to the orchestrator containing the unique func-
tion name. The orchestrator responds with a list of peers that have
already loaded this function. This list is limited by proximity of
peers, which is determined by latency estimation performed by
the orchestrator. Additionally, using the IP addresses of clients for
geotargeting can give a rough estimation of their location (e.g. from
which region or country they connect). Edgar clients cache this
information to relieve the orchestrator from requests.
Function Store. The function store is a HTTP server serving static
assets. These consist of code in form of JavaScript or WebAssembly
that makes up the application using Edgar. In order to assert trust,
all code is integrity protected and can optionally be encrypted.
Fallback. For every Edgar application, it is essential that a suf-
ficient number of peers is available. When bootstrapping Edgar
applications, all functions are additionally deployed as a server-side
fallback. As soon as enough peers are available (per region), the
fallback does not need to handle any function invocations.
3.3.1 Proximity-based Deployment. In order to deploy Edgar’s
centralised components, well-known approaches can be used. Since
code of Edgar functions is static and integrity protected, deploying
the function store via an untrusted CDN can significantly improve
scalability and response times. To prevent the orchestrator from be-
coming a bottleneck, is is possible to replicate multiple instances of
it in different regions. Since Edgar clients discover the orchestrator
based on proximity, this approach is transparent to clients. Finally,
deploying the fallback functions on a traditional FaaS infrastructure
achieves good scalability without generating high costs as it only
receives invocations sporadically, especially when bootstrapping a
new application.
3.4 Edgar on Client-side
The client-side components of Edgar are separated into a trusted
and untrusted part. This is achieved by adding a second execution
engine to the Edgar browser. This engine is protected by an SGX
enclave and therefore trusted. While both engines are capable of
executing JavaScript and WebAssembly code, the trusted one only
executes signed (and optionally encrypted) code. Functions are
executed in the trusted part, which can happen on behalf of a local
or remote function invocation. In the untrusted part, the router
component uses information obtained from the orchestrator to
delegate function invocations.
Starting Edgar.As instructed by the orchestrator, the client down-
loads functions from the function store and calls into the trusted
part to forward the code. In the trusted part, the function manager
verifies the signature and decrypts the code if necessary; then it
installs the functions.
Connection Management. After requesting peers in proximity
from the orchestrator, the router preemptively establishes WebRTC
connections to all of them to decrease latencies for first-time calls.
To reduce call latencies, the first invocation is issued to whichever
connection is established first. After this invocation, clients contin-
uously measure the response times to choose low-latency peers for
future calls. Since the peer’s current load and connection quality
also influences these measurements, Edgar automatically priori-
tises non-overloaded peers with a good connection. During appli-
cation runtime, it is not uncommon for a peer to disappear, e.g.
due to network issues or users closing their browsers. Therefore,
peer connections are terminated upon close requests or if WebRTC
keep-alive messages are not responded to. When many peers dis-
connect, the Edgar client asynchronously issues new requests to
the orchestrator.
Limiting Resource Usage. The resources consumed by Edgar
functions can be limited by kernel- (e.g. cgroups) or browser-
based solutions (e.g. Opera GX5). While this can prevent overload-
ing of clients, it has implications for service providers as users can
now adjust their settings to only contribute minimally. In combi-
nation with trusted resource accounting [27, 28], service providers
can incentivise (e.g. add-free services, exclusive features, or digi-
tal goods) users to provide resources above certain limits or even
exclude them from the application.
3.5 Edgar Functions
An Edgar application can instruct the function manager to invoke
a function by passing its name and parameters. The function man-
ager directly invokes it if it is installed locally; otherwise, a remote
peer or ultimately the fallback is contacted. For that, the router
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application category example app example function data source data sink data size suitability
collaboration tool Etherpad change set merging peer peer small ⬤⬤⬤
web game Agar.io anti-cheat peer peer small ⬤⬤⬤
digital assistant Almond [30] intent classification peer cloud small ⬤⬤⬤
private web search Cyclosa [31] query forwarding peer cloud small ⬤⬤⬤
upload preprocessing Twitter image scaling peer cloud medium ⬤⬤◯
recommendation system YouTube retrieve recommendations cloud peer small ⬤⬤◯
video conferencing Jitsi stream processing peer peer large ⬤⬤◯
p2p video streaming PrivaTube [32] stream processing peer peer large ⬤⬤◯
streaming service Netflix video transcoding cloud cloud large ⬤◯◯
Table 1: Suitability of different web application categories for Edgar. Categories showcased in this paper are highlighted.
parameters. After the receiving peer’s function manager decrypts
the parameters, the function is invoked locally and the encrypted
result is returned to the client. In case no peer with the appropriate
function is available, the fallback is used. For the application, func-
tion invocation is transparent, regardless of where the function is
ultimately invoked. The router manages a peer rating for every peer
by periodically measuring the response time to all connected peers.
Using the peer with the lowest response time allows Edgar to find
the closest peer available and relieve potentially overloaded peers.
Function State. Edgar functions are –in the best case– stateless,
e.g. they do not rely on persistent data shared with other functions.
However, function code can access existing storage services for
sharing data. Edgar also supports direct access to services that
are usually part of the back-end (e.g. a database, blob storage or
key-value store) as described in § 3.7. Additionally, Edgar supports
local function state by allowing functions to persist data in browsers
by using standard web APIs.
3.6 Edgar Applications
The application parts of an Edgar application that should be of-
floaded must consist of self-contained functions; hybrid applica-
tions where only parts run on top of Edgar are possible. Since this
matches the programming model of FaaS, an existing FaaS applica-
tion can also run on Edgar. However, as for FaaS, certain types of
applications are more suited for an Edgar deployment than others.
For example, Edgar is especially suited for applications that do
not solely depend on centrally stored data. Additionally, the size
of processed data is important, as well as whether it is processed
locally on Edgar peers or centrally. Furthermore, the application’s
latency sensitivity and computation-intensiveness also influence
its suitability for Edgar. Table 1 lists several example application
categories, showing their main data sources (excluding initialisa-
tion) and data sinks. Here, peer means that data is generated or
processed on Edgar peers, whereas cloud means that data is loaded
from or stored at central locations. The table distinguishes between
data sizes from small (<10 MB) over medium (<500 MB) to large
(≥500 MB). We rate the suitability of applications for Edgar with
excellent (⬤⬤⬤), good (⬤⬤◯) or poor (⬤◯◯). For example,
applications that process small amounts of data from peers are
excellent use cases for Edgar, such as collaboration tools, games,
digital assistants or private web search. We still assume good suit-
ability, if applications process medium data sizes generated at peers,
e.g. for preprocessing uploads such as images or videos for social
networks. The same applies for applications where small amounts
of cloud-based data is processed, such as in a recommendation
system. When processing large amounts of data, we rate the ap-
plication to still have good suitability, if the data is produced and
consumed on Edgar peers, as in peer-to-peer video conferencing
streaming. However, when a lot of cloud-based data is processed
and then again stored in the cloud, we see poor suitability, e.g. video
transcoding.
3.7 Security
Service providers of Edgar applications need to ensure that only
SGX-enabled clients execute functions and that these clients exe-
cute the correct code. To achieve that, remote attestation is used (see
§ 2.3). While loading the web page, a remote attestation request is
sent to the service provider, containing (i) a quote, which identifies
the enclave’s code as well as initial data and can be forwarded to
the Intel Attestation Service (IAS); and (ii) an ephemeral public key
which is generated during enclave startup and cryptographically
bound to the quote. Upon retrieval, the service provider verifies
that the enclave identity is known, i.e. that the client is running a
genuine Edgar enclave containing the expected code. Then, the
quote is forwarded to the IAS; a positive reply indicates that the en-
clave was started on a genuine SGX-capable platform. The remote
attestation process finishes with the service provider using the en-
clave’s public key for encrypting a symmetric key called the script
secret with the enclave’s public key. The script secret is unique for
every web application and can be updated regularly. Edgar clients
use this secret to verify Message Authentication Codes (MACs) of
(i) JavaScript code embedded in the HTML of the web application;
(ii) JavaScript or WebAssembly code retrieved from the function
manager; or (iii) messages exchanged between enclaves. Addition-
ally, the script secret can be used for decrypting any of these assets,
if confidentiality protection is enabled. By using MACs instead of
signatures, non-repudiation of messages is not fulfilled. However,
since the script secret is only distributed to attested enclaves, this
is no concern.
Attestation Between Peers. Edgar enclaves primarily commu-
nicate with other enclaves, e.g. for function invocation. All com-
munication is integrity protected and encrypted using the script
secret. The service provider is considered trusted (see § 2.4) and
only exposes the script secret to trustworthy enclaves. Therefore,
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Edgar establishes trust between peers using the script secret be-
cause (i) only trustworthy enclaves are able to decrypt peer-to-peer
messages, and (ii) an enclave receiving such a message can be sure
that the communication partner has undergone a successful remote
attestation with the service provider. Using this implicit attestation,
no further actions after connecting to a peer need to be performed
to establish a secure channel.
Generic TLS Proxy. Most web applications interact with back-
end systems for server-side application logic or storage (e.g. blob
storage, databases or key-value-stores). These systems are usually
deployed behind web servers, should not interact with clients di-
rectly, and often have no support for encrypted access. Therefore,
Edgar includes the generic TLS proxy, which is deployed in front of
back-end systems and uses a special Certificate Authority (CA) to
enable implicit remote attestation between the proxy and connected
enclaves. The CA issues client certificates after the remote attes-
tation process described before. Accepting only certificates from
this CA, the proxy employs mutual authentication to ensure only
genuine Edgar enclaves have access.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
Edgar’s function store is implemented as an HTTP server in Type-
Script, the orchestrator is written in TypeScript as well. The signal-
ing server uses PeerJS6 for WebRTC signaling. We implement the
orchestrator and signaling server in the same process; as this eases
communication between these components, e.g. for notifications
when clients disconnect. The fallback (see § 3.3) is deployed on AWS
Lambda7 and Cloudflare Workers8. Edgar’s generic proxy (see § 3.7)
is based on the universal TLS tunnel stunnel9 and is implemented
as an HTTP server in Node.js. The client-side part of Edgar is
written in TypeScript as well, also uses PeerJS and connects to
the orchestrator via WebSockets. Although we envision support
for trusted execution being directly available as a browser API,
we resort to implementing our prototype as a browser extension
based on theWebExtensions API10. The extension communicates
via native messaging11 with the backend, which is the V812 runtime
on top of SGX-LKL [17] enabling trusted execution of JavaScript
and WebAssembly. The only SGX-specific component of Edgar
is this backend. Replacing it with an implementation based on a
different TEE platform such as ARM TrustZone13, AMD-SEV14
or Keystone [18] is possible. However, since these technologies
offer different security guarantees, some assumptions have to be
reconsidered when porting Edgar.
Code Examples. In the following, we showcase the convenience
of Edgar function implementation for developers. For the sake














4 int EMSCRIPTEN_KEEPALIVE sub(int a, int b) {
5 return a - b;
6 }
Listing 1: C Code for WebAssembly sub function
1 // no wasm module needed
2
3 function add(a, b) {
4 return a + b;
5 }
6
7 async function __init() {







Listing 2: Pure JavaScript code for add function.
1 let wasm = null;
2
3 function sub(a, b) {
4 return wasm.exports['_sub'](a, b);
5 }
6
7 async function __init() {
8 //fetch, decrypt and







Listing 3: Wrapper code for WebAssembly sub function.
which add or subtract their inputs a and b. In this example, add is a
function written in pure JavaScript, while sub is as WebAssembly
function originally written in C. Listing 1 shows the C code of
sub which is compiled into a WebAssembly module using Em-
scripten [33]. The EMSCRIPTEN_KEEPALIVE macro makes the
function an exported function of the WebAssembly module (i.e. it
is callable from JavaScript) and additionally prevents inlining or
removal by the compiler. Listings 2 and 3 shows the JavaScript code
needed for add and sub. In this case, the add function does not
need any initialisation, but more complex functions would initialise
libraries here (e.g. Tensorflow, see § 5.2). In contrast, the JavaScript
wrapper for sub needs to fetch the corresponding WebAssembly
module from the function store, decrypt and instantiate it via the
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exported function _sub (which is preceded by an underscore ac-
cording to Emscripten convention). The Edgarmiddleware expects
each function definition to return an object containing a mapping to
the callable function (func) and the initialisation function (init).
Using this object, the local function manager can initialise the func-
tion when loading it and subsequently invoke the corresponding
function. For invoking the function, the client-side code simply calls
the add or sub function locally; they resolve to stubs generated
by Edgar that create and handle the invocation request. Deploying
these Edgar functions as fallback on state-of-the-art FaaS offerings
such as AWS Lambda or Cloudflare Workers is easily possible since
both also use Node.js as JavaScript/WebAssembly runtime.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate different aspects of Edgar and its
underlying technologies. We start with evaluating Edgar’s latency
impact (§ 5.1). Then, we describe use case applications (§ 5.2). We
continue with evaluating end-user latency and service costs (§ 5.3)
as well as the scalability of Edgar (§ 5.4). Our last evaluation (§ 5.5)
covers the impact of unresponsive peers on Edgar. Finally, we
conclude this evaluation section by discussing attacks in § 5.6.
5.1 Latency Impact of Edgar
The end-to-end latency between to Edgar peers experiences delays
from different sources such as (i) overhead of enclave transitions;
(ii) overhead due to copying data to/from enclave memory; (iii) ad-
ditional overhead induced by SGX-LKL; and (iv) overhead added
by the Edgar browser extension. To evaluate the overall latency
impact on Edgar, we perform a round trip measurement using
two machines equipped with an SGX-capable Intel Core i7-6500U
CPU connected via a 1 GBit switch. On both machines, we run
the Chromium browser with our extension installed and exchange
messages via WebRTC synchronously, i.e. the next message is sent
when the reply for the first one is received. We send 100 messages
for payload sizes from 16 bytes to 1MB. To compare WebRTC via
Edgar with plain WebRTC, requests and replies are either routed
through the Edgar browser extension and the attached SGX enclave
or not. Furthermore, we add artificial network delays of 10ms and
50ms using tc netem to simulate different distances between
peers. Fig. 3 shows the average latencies for one message exchange.
We ignore the reproducible outlier for WebRTC via Edgar with
a 10ms delay for a 256 KB payload, as we suspect a bug in either
Chromium or Edgar’s browser extension. For smaller payloads
up to 4 KB, the latencies are constant, with plain WebRTC adding
1−2ms and Edgar additionally adding 3−4ms. For larger payloads
up to 1MB, the latencies increase; Edgar adds up to 250ms due
to larger buffers that are copied from the website via the browser
extension into the SGX enclave and back. For no artificial delay
(i.e. for sub millisecond latencies), the relative latency overhead
of Edgar is high: 220% for small and 68% for large payloads. For
medium artificial delays (10ms), Edgar’s average latency over-
head for all payload sizes is 22%. Finally, for larger artificial delays
(50ms), the average latency overhead is 6% for small payloads and
up to 20% for larger payloads. In summary, Edgar adds a small
delay in most cases. While we observe a large relative overhead
for local networks, it does only have a small effect when latencies












WebRTC via Edgar 0ms delay 50ms delay
Plain WebRTC 10ms delay












Figure 3: Average latency impact of Edgar for different net-
work delays.
are more realistic. Note that the browser extension itself induces
the highest overhead of 1.1ms in our non-optimised prototype. If
trusted execution would be natively supported by browsers, the
only overhead would be the latency overhead of enclave transitions
in the order of microseconds [34, 35].
5.2 Use Cases
To evaluate Edgar, we implement two realistic web-based use
cases with different suitabilities from our discussion in § 3.6. First, a
digital assistant based on machine learning which performs intent
classification of text inputs and, second, a movie recommendation
system. We intentionally choose these two quite different use cases.
While the digital assistant processes data produced at the peers,
the recommendation system depends on a centralised database.
However, both process relatively small amounts of data.
Digital Assistant. Our digital assistant is a chat bot designed to be
embedded into websites to interact with its users. It applies natural-
language understanding (NLU) on text messages with a pre-trained
model of approximately 5 MB to identify intents. We regard this
application a good example for Edgar, because (i) a pre-trained
model include secret data that motivates the application of trusted
execution; and (ii) offloading to nearby browsers is beneficial, if the
model is already loaded by the.
Therefore, this is a good example where offloading to nearby
browsers is beneficial, because the peer has already loaded the
model. The assistant supports the following seven intents: greet,
bye, affirmative, negative, wtf, playMusic, and finally
addEventToCalendar. The first four intents are used for con-
trolling the conversational flow, while insults or out-of-context
messages are classified as wtf. The two last intents trigger actual
8
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cost for 10M in-
vocations
A: Edgar same netw. 196 - 285 none $0
B: Edgar same city 246 - 329 none $0
C: Edgar same region 249 - 330 none $0
D: Lambda 3008 MB 370 300 - 400 $150 - $200
E: Lambda 2048 MB 378 300 - 400 $100 - $133
F: Lambda 1024 MB 694 600 - 700 $150 - $175
Table 2: Response times, most billed durations in AWS
Lambda and invocation costs for digital assistant use case.
actions; either streaming songs or creating calendar entries. We
assume the model itself and its inputs are confidential, classification
can therefore not be offloaded to clients without Edgar. Our bot is
implemented in TypeScript, based on the Aida chat bot16. It uses
Tensorflow.js17, which also supports training and classification in
WebAssembly. The intent classification function consists of 83 lines
of code and can be deployed on Edgar peers as well as on the
AWS Lambda FaaS platform. When invoked, the function fetches
model data from S3, loads it into Tensorflow, then performs intent
classification and finally returns the detected intent together with a
confidence value between 0 and 1. The model is only fetched once
and cached for future invocations.
Movie Recommendation System. The movie recommendation
system allows its users to browse or rate movies. Additionally, they
can list recommended movies, while recommendations are based
on their and other users’ ratings. We implement it using TypeScript
and Vue.js18. It contains nine individually distributable functions,
which allow users to log in to the application, browse movie titles
by genre, view and modify movie ratings, and retrieve recommen-
dations or information about specific titles. All functions obtain
information from a central MySQL database, which is securely
accessible through Edgar’s TLS Proxy (see § 3.7).
5.3 Response Times and Invocation Costs
Here, we want to show that deploying functions with Edgar can
actually reduce the response times experienced by end-users as
well as the cloud costs for service providers. Since Edgar enables
offloading code that is usually server-side, we compare deployments
of the classification function of our digital assistant use case on
Edgar and AWS Lambda. To facilitate different machine types
acting as Edgar peers, we install the classification function both
on a laptop with an i7-6500U CPU and a desktop machine with an
i7-6700 CPU.
We deploy one invoking and one executing Edgar peer in the
following configurations: (i) two Edgar peers in the same univer-
sity network (config A); (ii) two Edgar peers in the same city, the
invoking peer in a university network, the executing peer in a home
network (config B); (iii) two Edgar peers in the same region, the




network in a different city in the same region (config C). The home
networks are connected to the internet via DSL. In all configura-
tions, the orchestrator is located in the university network, but not
part of the latency measurements. We use Node.js processes instead
of browsers to perform the measurements. This only minimally
influences the results, as the same execution engine (V8) is used
and the latency added by the Edgar browser extension and SGX
enclaves is negligible (see § 5.1).
We deploy the classification function in the AWS region closest to
our university, which is eu-central-1 (Frankfurt). In Lambda, devel-
opers define the allocated memory per function deployment from
128 MB to 3008 MB in 64 MB steps, which also linearly increases
vCPU credits available to the function. We deploy the function in
the following configurations: 3008 MB allocated memory, which
is the maximum (config D); 2048 MB allocated memory (config E);
and 1024 MB allocated memory (config F). Since our function con-
sumes approximately 500 MB of memory, execution times become
unacceptable for lower memory amounts: 1 second at 512 MB, up
to 10 seconds at 128 MB at higher costs.
In all configurations, we use a machine in our university network
for invoking the function and reporting the response time. We
invoke the digital assistant’s classification function 100 times with
randomly chosen sentences from a test data set19 consisting of 1500
sentences with lengths between 3 and 141 characters. We report
the average response time experienced by end-users in Table 2.
For the Edgar deployments, we measure response times between
196 and 249 ms for desktop peers and between 285 and 330 ms for
laptop peers depending on placement of peers. For AWS Lambda,
we observe response times between 370 ms and 694 ms depending
on the configured memory for the FaaS environment. This results
in response times for Edgar ranging from 11% (C laptop/D), over
13% (B laptop/E) and 35% (B desktop/E) up to 410% (A desktop/F)
shorter than for a deployment on AWS Lambda.
Furthermore, we estimate costs for invocations in the AWS
Lambda deployments. Function invocations are billed $2 per 10M
request plus a fixed amount per 100 ms duration, rounded up to
the nearest 100 ms. This fixed amount varies, depending on the
AWS region and the allocated memory20. Table 2 shows the most
billed durations by Lambda per configuration and the resulting es-
timated costs for 10M invocations for different deployments. While
function invocation on Edgar peers does not generate direct costs
for service providers, an AWS Lambda deployment generates cost
between $100 and $200 per 10M requests. To set this into context,
we envision a web application of 10 (possibly chained) functions
with one million daily active users, each invoking the functions 10
times per day. On AWS Lambda, this application would generate
yearly costs of up to $730,000. In comparison, placing the Edgar
orchestrator on a reasonably large VM21 in all 20 AWS regions
would only generate costs of $24,000 per year. As functions only
allocate relatively small amounts of storage, costs for a function
store deployed on AWS S3 would be negligible22.
19https://aida.dor.ai/models/dataset_testing.json
20https://aws.amazon.com/lambda/pricing
21t3a.xlarge (4 vCPUs, 16GB RAM, 5Gbit/s) ~$100/month
22approx. $0.025 per GB per month, $0.0055 for 1000 write requests, $0.0004 for 1000
read requests, see https://aws.amazon.com/s3/pricing/
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In summary, these observations show that users of Edgar can
experience significantly lower response times compared to a tra-
ditional FaaS deployment, while also generating lower costs for
service providers.
5.4 Scalability
An additional advantage of Edgar is that scalability of web appli-
cations can be achieved by leveraging client-side resources that im-
plicitly scale with increasing numbers of users. To evaluate this, we
take two different functions from our movie recommendation sys-
tem (see § 5.2). The first function getAllGenres issues queries to
the database and returns a list of all genres in the database. It is used
as an example for an I/O intensive function not performing signifi-
cant computation. The second function getRecommendations
executes a nearest neighbour algorithm for the user’s ratings and
100 other users’ ratings to find recommendable movies. Although it
also fetches user ratings from the database, most of its computation
is used for the algorithm; it is, therefore, an example for a com-
putation intensive function. We provision different AWS instance
types (t3.micro for peers and t3.medium for servers) and deploy one
server instance for Edgar’s signaling server, orchestrator, function
store, database and web server in the us-east-2 region. Additionally,
multiple Edgar peers are provisioned across 10 AWS regions23;
again we use Node.js processes instead of browsers, because AWS
does not support SGX yet. We install the two Edgar functions on all
peers and provision a special peer calledmeasurer with no functions
installed in the us-west-1 region. Note that no clients share a region
with the database server for simulating realistic latencies. However,
we intentionally let one regular peer and the measurer share the
same region to represent nearby peers. In this measurement, we
compare three configurations: (i) 1 peer close to the measurer; (ii) 20
peers, i.e., 2 peers per region; and (iii) the baseline, where functions
are invoked traditionally on server-side via HTTP. We let the mea-
surer issue invocation requests to Edgar peers at fixed rates and
measure the response time, excluding connection establishments.
First, we let the measurer invoke the I/O intensive function
getAllGenres at fixed throughputs from 1 to 1400 requests
per second; in steps of 100. We stop measuring if the response
time exceeds 1000 ms because this is a clear sign of the system
being saturated. Fig. 4 shows the average call response times in
correlation to the throughput for this function.We see that invoking
functions through Edgar induces an up to 32% higher response
time due to an additional network hop between the measurer and
the database server. The configuration with one peer achieves stable
response times for up to 538 requests per second, which is a 39%
lower throughput than the baseline. Here, the single peer cannot
handle as many requests as the more powerful server machine
and becomes a bottleneck. When looking at the configuration with
20 peers, we see a higher throughput of up to 1, 264 requests per
second, 1.67× higher than the baseline. This setup scales until the
capacity of the centralised database server is saturated.
Second, the measurer invokes the computationally intensive
functiongetRecommendations.We use the same requests rates
as before, but add measurements between 1 and 25 requests per
23specifically, we use us-east-1, us-west-1, us-west-2, ca-central-1 , sa-east-1, eu-central-
1, eu-west-1, eu-west-2, eu-west-3 and eu-north-1
dwell
time 𝑑
RTT 𝑟 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. for workload durations (𝑤)
1 ms 10 ms 100 ms 1 s 10 s
10 ms 0.01% 0.03% 0.18% 1.68% 16.68%
1 min 100 ms 0.09% 0.10% 0.25% 1.75% 16.75%
400 ms 0.34% 0.35% 0.50% 2.00% 17.00%
10 ms 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.08% 0.83%
20 min 100 ms 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.09% 0.84%
400 ms 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.10% 0.85%
10 ms 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.42%
40 min 100 ms 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 0.42%
400 ms 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.05% 0.43%
Table 3: Probabilities of unresponsive peers due to different
dwell times, round-trip times and workload durations.
second. Fig. 4 shows the average response time depending on the
throughput. Compared to the previous measurement, we report
(i) an overall lower throughput because the benchmark is CPU
bound, and (ii) an overall higher response time, because the func-
tions take longer to complete. Again, we see a higher response time
due to one additional network hop. The configuration with 1 Edgar
peer performs similarly to the baseline, as both achieve up to 24
requests per second. For more peers, Edgar achieves up to 468
requests per second, which is 19.5× the baseline and the single peer
configuration; showing that Edgar scales linearly with increased
numbers of peers.
To summarise, these two measurements show that the perfor-
mance of Edgar scales with increasing numbers of peers because
more resources become available for offloading. We also see that
computation intensive functions are better candidates for offloading.
Finally, in contrast to the evaluation of the digital assistant use case
(see § 5.3), Edgar peers observe higher response times, because this
recommendation system use case contains a centralised database,
resulting in an additional network hop.
5.5 Unresponsive Peers and Reconnections
In a real-world Edgar application, peers are expected to become
unresponsive due to multiple reasons: (i) users leaving the websites
(e.g. closing their browser or specific browser tabs); (ii) external
reasons such as network issues; or (iii) malicious peers that do not
respond to invocation requests. For the first class of events, we
introduce a probability model to estimate the probability of peers
being unresponsive 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. , which is described in the following.
We exclude the second and third class from our model, as such
events are unpredictable. In these cases, peers would run in the
timeout configured by the function developer and retry with a
different peer. We consider two peers 𝐴 and 𝐵, where peer 𝐴 sends
invocation requests to peer 𝐵. We introduce the following variables:
𝑑 , the dwell time of peer 𝐵 (i.e., the time the user spends on the
website), the WebRTC round-trip time 𝑟 between 𝐴 and 𝐵, and𝑤 ,
the duration the workload needs to finish processing. Peer 𝐵 will be
unresponsive, if the invocation request is sent in the last 𝑙 = 𝑤 + 𝑟2
seconds of the dwell time 𝑑 . Assuming a uniform distribution of
10
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Figure 4: Throughput and latency of invocations of I/O intensive function (left) and CPU intensive function (right).
function invocations, we can estimate the probability 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. of




To calculate the probabilities, we assume the following realistic
ranges for the introduced variables: Users spend between 70 seconds
and 40 minutes on a website, depending on its type [36, 37]. There-
fore, we assume 1, 20 and 40 minutes for the dwell time 𝑑 . For
WebRTC round trip times, we use the values of 10 ms, 100 ms and
400 ms reported in [38] for local, university and mobile networks.
Since workload runtimes are application-specific, we assume values
from 10 ms to 10 s for𝑤 . Table 3 shows the calculated probabilities
for these ranges. We see, that for the most combinations, probabili-
ties are well below 0.1% and only exceed 10% when the workload
processing time ranges near the peer’s dwell time (shaded cells).
Edgar’s frequent WebRTC keep-alive messages further decrease
these probabilities, as broken connections are detected earlier. For
Edgar, this means that websites with expected shorter dwell times
are more suited for shorter workload executions, while websites
with expected longer dwell times (such as social networks) are more
capable of handling longer workload execution times.
We use the reported probabilities for the following experiment:
We deploy a WebAssembly function performing an integer addition
as a Cloudflare Worker (see §4) and on Edgar. Choosing configured
timeouts from 100 to 1,000 ms, we examine probabilities of 0.1%,
1% and 5%. These are induced by randomly dropping invocation
requests with the given probability. A fully responsive peer (Edgar
baseline) and the Cloudflare deployment (FaaS fallback) are both un-
affected by the configured timeout and act as baselines. We invoke
every function 1000 times and report the average response time
for a successful reply. The results in Fig. 5 show, that the Edgar
baseline performs best with an average response time of 4.5 ms,
closely followed by 0.1% unresponsive peers with 4.9 ms average
response time. All invocations to partly unresponsive peers stay
below the average response time of the FaaS fallback of 62.7 ms.
Our measured values only come close to this baseline if 5% of the
peers are unresponsive and a relatively large timeout is configured.
Combining these insights with the ones from our probability model,
we conclude that an Edgar deployment will be largely unaffected
by unresponsive peers.
















Edgar baseline 0.1% unresp. 1% unresp.
5% unresp. FaaS fallback
Figure 5: Response times for different shares of unresponsive
peers and various timeouts.
5.6 Security Analysis
In the following, we discuss possible attacks against Edgar accord-
ing to our assumed threat model (see § 2.4).
Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks. Local attackers can stop or deny
starting enclaves at any time. In typical SGX threat models DoS
attacks are excluded, as there are no countermeasures. In Edgar,
such an attack only affects the attacker’s machine and thus does not
compromise the whole system. Whenever a client sends a request
to a peer and does not receive an answer before a timeout occurs,
it will retry with a different peer and ultimately use the fallback.
Unexpected Function Installation. The only entry point to the
enclave, besides processing a message from a peer, is responsible for
loading a function. An Edgar function is shipped in a signed (and
optionally encrypted) file containing WebAssembly or JavaScript
code. Therefore, an attacker can only install functions that are
signed by the service provider. Consequently, the attacker is only
able to install functions defined by the service provider. However,
as these functions’ availability is not communicated to the orches-
trator, other clients will never connect to this peer.
Peer Privacy Attacks. In Edgar, IP addresses are exposed to other
peers and the orchestrator. Both can use the information to log
peer availability or draw conclusions regarding their location. An
IETF draft [39] proposes to conceal IP addresses with dynamically
11
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generated Multicast DNS names, thus protecting privacy. Edgar
can use this as it is already implemented in Safari and has been
announced for Chrome.
Overloading Peers. An attacker can flood a peer with invocation
requests aiming to overload that peer’s processing power. If an
Edgar client observes an abnormally high number of requests from
a single peer, the client terminates the connection to that peer and
locally blacklists it.
Modified or Forged Messages. Due to the untrusted side of the
system being responsible for accessing the network, an attacker is
able to drop, modify or forge any network packets. All modified
messages will be detected due to a wrong MAC and dropped. Mes-
sage forging is not possible, as they are encrypted using the script
secret (see § 3.7).
Replayed, Dropped or Out-of-Order Messages. In Edgar, all
responses are verified to contain the same nonce used in the request
to prevent replay attacks. Incorporating a monotonic counter in
requests, enables the detection of messages being dropped or sent
out-of-order.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss research work related to Edgar.
Offloading to End-Users. Offloading computation to personal
machines of end-users has also been explored in the context of
volunteer computing [40–42]. However, research has also shown
that contributors lose interest quickly [43]. Since Edgar focuses
on interactive workloads that relate to the used web application,
this is less of an issue for Edgar.
Offloading to Browsers. Several systems explore offloading com-
putations or data to browsers, but do not make use of trusted ex-
ecution at client-side: Akamai NetSession [44] is a commercially
available CDN that is capable of offloading traffic to participating
peers without support for offloading computations. Maygh [45]
is a CDN consisting of browsers, offloading the delivery of static
content to many clients. Similarly to Edgar, the system is based
on WebRTC and includes one or more coordinators that manage
the available peers. The main difference to Edgar is that Maygh
can only deliver static content, but does not support the sharing
of computation results, due to untrusted clients. Legion [46] and
Pando [47] also apply WebRTC to distribute computations across
web browsers, but do not consider untrusted clients.
Trusted Offloading to Browsers. Other works also combine
trusted execution with web browsers. Our own previous work
TrustJS [48] is the predecessor of the Edgar browser extension
and also enabled trusted execution of JavaScript in web browsers.
However, the early prototype of TrustJS was not suited for ac-
tual computations, since it is based on a slow interpreter without
support for JIT or WebAssembly. Furthermore, it does not enable
distributed applications as it has no support for orchestration or
direct function invocation. Also, it is not usable anymore because it
use a deprecated browser API. Fidelius [49] protects user inputs into
web applications from a malicious operating system. It uses single-
board computers with large Trusted Computing Bases (TCBs) to
create a trusted path from input to output devices. Similarly to
TrustJS, code is split into trusted and untrusted parts, each being
executed in an SGX-protected JavaScript runtime. However, this
runtime can only interpret JavaScript code at low performance and
has no support for WebAssembly. Furthermore, Fidelius does not
target distributed applications.
The goal of our previous work Cyclosa [31] is to protect personal
data of web search users. It uses a peer-to-peer network in combi-
nation with SGX to obfuscate the user’s query before sending it to
the web search service. However, Cyclosa only supports one single
application, which is web search. In fact, Edgar can be viewed as a
sequel of Cyclosa allowing arbitrary applications: while Cyclosa
cannot be used to implement other types of web applications, it
could be implemented using Edgar (see § 3.6).
PrivaTube [32] is a browser-based CDN focused on video streams
and uses SGX to establish trust in browsers. However, it considers
neither direct communication between browsers nor computations.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented Edgar, a novel middleware that allows
service providers to distribute a web application over its current
users’ machines. Thus, service providers can save costs while users
of such applications can contribute to its provisioning, e.g. in ex-
change for ad-free services. Edgar establishes trust into browsers
by applying trusted execution technology to offload function exe-
cution securely. To improve response times, functions are directly
invoked on nearby browsers using peer-to-peer communication. In
our evaluation, we showed that Edgar copes well with unrespon-
sive peers, generates lower costs and scales linearly with increasing
numbers of participants.
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